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Abstract
As the global banking crisis intensified in the fall of 2008, governments announced 
comprehensive rescue packages for financial institutions. In this paper, we put the 
joint response of euro area bank and sovereign CDS premia under the microscope. We 
find that the bank rescue packages led to a clear structural break in these premia's 
comovement, which had been rather tight and stable in the weeks preceding the in-
tensification of the crisis. Firstly, the packages induced a decrease in risk spreads for 
banks at the expense of a marked increase in risk spreads for governments. Secondly, 
we show that in addition to this one-off jump in the levels  of CDS spreads, the 
packages strongly increased the sensitivity of sovereign risk spreads to any further 
aggravation of the crisis. At the same time, the sensitivity of bank credit risk premia 
declined and became more sovereign-like, reflecting the extensive government 
guarantees of banking sector liabilities. 
Keywords: Financial crisis, risk transfer, credit default swaps 
JEL Classification: G15, G21 5
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Non-technical summary 
We analyse the joint dynamics of credit risk premia of euro area sovereign and bank 
debt from January 2008 to June 2009. As a first result, we find a strong comovement 
of weekly credit default swap (CDS) premia for the first half of our sample: a single 
common risk factor, the iTraxx index of non-financial CDS premia, explains a large 
proportion of the variability in sovereign and individual corporate (banks but also 
non-financial) CDS premia. The common factor captures the effects from a 
deteriorating macroeconomic outlook and changing risk aversion. 
In early October 2008, euro area governments announced rescue packages for their 
national banking systems. In response, risk spreads of financial firms declined while 
sovereign spreads increased as investors perceived a ‘credit risk transfer’ from the 
banking sector to the government. Afterwards, however, both spreads re-widened as 
the crisis aggravated further. 
As a second result, using regressions with breaks and time-varying parameters, we 
find that besides this one-off level effect, the credit risk transfer had a dynamic 
dimension. For bank CDS premia, the slope in the regression on the common risk 
factor decreased after the announcement of the packages. For the sovereign issuers, 
bearing the fiscal burden, the opposite effect occurred. Thus, the financial rescue 
packages apparently slowed down the increase of risk premia for banks, but at the 
considerable cost of increasing the sensitivity of sovereign risk premia to any further 
crisis aggravation. 6
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1 Introduction
We analyse bank and government credit risk premia of ten major euro area countries
between January 2008 and June 2009. As a ﬁrst result, we ﬁnd that a large proportion of
CDS premia variation of both banks and sovereign issuers is explained by a single common
factor. This common regressor for individual bank and sovereign CDS premia is chosen to
be the iTraxx index of non-ﬁnancial CDS premia.1 We interpret it as a proxy for a ‘common
risk factor’, capturing the eﬀect stemming from a deteriorating macroeconomic outlook,
but also from changing investors’ risk aversion. This interpretation is supported by the
fact that regressions of single-name non-ﬁnancial corporate CDS premia on the iTraxx
index tend to show high measures of ﬁt as well. Moreover, the result is robust against
using other natural candidates of common factors such as the ﬁrst principal component of
the standardised CDS premia or their simple median.
This strong comovement notwithstanding, the movements in risk spreads in mid-
October deviated signiﬁcantly from the previously observed pattern. In fact, for a short
period, CDS premia of banks declined at the same time as sovereign spreads increased.
This divergence resulted from the announcement by most euro area governments of var-
ious guarantee and rescue packages for the national banking systems. Hence, investors
perceived this as a ‘credit risk transfer’ from the banking sector to the government, which
led to a drop in ﬁnancial spreads, and an increase in sovereign spreads.2 Afterwards,
however, both spreads picked up again as the overall state of the crisis aggravated further.
Besides this one-oﬀ level eﬀect of risk transfer, did the introduction of governments’
rescue packages also change the relative dynamics of bank and sovereign CDS premia? In
other words, did the way in which these two groups of spreads comoved with the common
risk factor change? We assess this question by allowing for a structural break as well as
by running the regressions allowing for smoothly varying parameters using the Kalman
ﬁlter. We ﬁnd clear evidence that for bank CDS premia the slope in the regression on
the common risk factor has decreased after the introduction of the rescue packages. For
the sovereign issuer, bearing the ﬁscal burden of these packages, the opposite eﬀect is
observed.
Thus, as a second ﬁnding, the ﬁnancial rescue packages have apparently been eﬀective
in slowing down the increase of risk premia for ﬁnancial institutions, but came at the
considerable cost of increasing the sensitivity of sovereign risk premia to changes in the
1The iTraxx non-ﬁnancial CDS index comprises the 100 non-ﬁnancial entities from the iTraxx Europe
index, which includes also non-euro area ﬁrms. The included ﬁrms are divided into ﬁve broad sectors:
Auto, Consumer, Energy, Industrial and Technology/Media/Telecommunications (TMT). The indices are
rebalanced every six months, and for the index with the ‘roll date’ 29 September 2008, for instance, the
ﬁve countries with most ﬁrms represented were: France (24), United Kingdom (24), Germany (20) and the
Netherlands (8).
2See, e.g., European Central Bank (2009a).7
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overall severity of the ﬁnancial crisis. The changed dependence on the common risk factor
was not a short-lived phenomenon: at end-June 2009, the sensitivity of bank CDS premia
was still below the magnitudes of mid-2008, while that of sovereign CDSs appeared to
have settled on a markedly higher level.
Regarding related literature, Geyer, Kossmeier, and Pichler (2004) ﬁnd marked co-
movement of euro area bond spreads, as two latent factors explain the bulk of variation
across issuing countries and maturities. Moreover, in a regression of the factor explaining
long-maturity spreads on explanatory variables, they ﬁnd that the EMU corporate bond
spread comes out as a highly signiﬁcant explanatory variable – a result in line with the
ﬁndings of our study that there is a close relation between corporate and sovereign credit
spreads. Beber, Brandt, and Kavajecz (2009) come to the conclusion that credit risk is a
relevant determinant for bond spreads, but that liquidity is the pre-dominating factor in
times of market stress. When relating this to our results it is important to note that we use
CDS premia rather than cash bond spreads. Since positions in CDS contracts, contrary
to positions in cash bonds, need no up-front funding, the information implied by these
swaps is likely to have been less distorted by the simultaneous dry-up of both market and
funding liquidity at the height of the crisis relative to cash instruments.3 Moreover, the
extent of the increase in CDS premia over the crisis does suggest by itself the relevance of
increased credit risk premia. In addition, the results of Beber et al. (2009) are obtained for
the period April 2003 to December 2004, and therefore do not cover periods of as extreme
and prolonged market stress as in our analysis. Somewhat in contrast with the results of
Beber et al. (2009), Codogno, Favero, and Missale (2003) conclude that yield diﬀerentials
between euro area government bonds are to a large degree explained by international risk
factors, which represent changes in perceived default risk of government bonds in the euro
area. Liquidity factors play a more subordinate role. Likewise in line with our results,
Favero, Pagano, and von Thadden (2008) emphasise that there is a common trend in euro
area bond spreads, representing an aggregate measure of risk. In a similar vein, Bernoth,
von Hagen, and Schuknecht (2004) ﬁnd that global investors’ attitude towards credit risk
is one driving force for euro area sovereign bond spreads. Based on monthly data from
1999 to 2006, Manganelli and Wolswijk (2007) also ﬁnd that a common factor is driving
both sovereign bond spreads and corporate spreads in the euro area. However, they iden-
tify it as the short-term interest rate. In doing so, their interpretation diﬀers from ours.
They suggest that lower short-term rates spur institutional investors (endowed with rigid
return targets) to take on more risk, eventually leading to a compression of risk premia.
The paper by Mody (2009) focuses like ours on the current turmoil and uses weekly
data as well. However, the focus is solely on sovereign spreads, while we take a joint view
3A similar, funding-related divergence between diﬀerent market-implied measures were seen, for ex-
ample, in the markets for inﬂation-linked bonds and swaps, where the latter were clearly less aﬀected by
market distortions.8
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on sovereign and bank CDS premia. As one of his key results, Mody ﬁnds that “countries
with the largest decline in competitiveness display a particularly strong link between the
prospects of the ﬁnancial sector and sovereign spreads”. Mody identiﬁes two turning
points regarding euro area sovereign spread dynamics. The ﬁrst is the rescue of Bear
Stearns in March 2008. In fact, sovereign spreads in the euro area showed the ﬁrst strong
upsurge at this time. The second is the nationalisation of Anglo Irish in mid-January
2009. Interestingly, however, our analysis does not point to a marked change in the spread
sensitivity with respect to the common risk factor associated with these dates. Recent
work by Sgherri and Zoli (2009) points out that since October 2008, markets have evidently
become more concerned about current and future ﬁscal positions as well as about ﬁnancial-
sector stability, when pricing euro area sovereign debt. Finally, when interpreting sovereign
bond spreads during the ﬁnancial crisis, Barrios, Iversen, Lewandowska, and Setzer (2009)
emphasise the interaction between risk aversion and macroeconomic fundamentals. They
ﬁnd that the combination of elevated risk aversion and large current account deﬁcits
exacerbates the impact of deteriorated public ﬁnances on government bond spreads.
Summing up, strong comovement among euro area sovereign bond spreads as in our
study is identiﬁed by several studies in the literature, although with diﬀering interpreta-
tions. Moreover, the fact that a common factor is also relevant for explaining corporate
spreads has likewise been found in other studies. However, our study diﬀers from other
studies addressing euro area sovereign bond spreads in two dimensions. First, it uses a
relatively high data frequency but is conﬁned to a rather short period of time. This is
because we are essentially putting CDS premia developments during the extreme market
stress of 2008-09 under the microscope, rather than exploring structural relationships over
longer periods as in previous studies. Such an approach may be seen as adequate, given
the diﬀerent magnitudes of sovereign CDS premia before and after 2008 and the clear
corresponding break. In fact, from 2004, when most of the considered sovereign CDS
premia became available, to 2007, these data showed a rather ﬂat evolution most of the
time, varying in a very narrow range and displaying extended periods of stale quotes.
Second, our study takes a joint view on sovereign and single-name CDS premia, whereas
most studies in the literature – if they include information on both types of issuers – use
corporate-bond indices rather than ﬁrm-speciﬁc information.
The paper is structured as follows. The next section illustrates the relevance of the com-
mon risk factor by regressing individual CDS premia on the iTraxx index of non-ﬁnancial
CDS premia. The subsequent section allows for structural breaks in this relationship, and
– complementarily – conducts these regressions with time-varying parameters. Both is
intended to capture the change in risk exposure. The ﬁnal section concludes.9
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2 Bank and sovereign risk spreads in the early phases of the
turmoil: a common risk factor at work?
In the beginning of 2008, the ﬁnancial crisis had already brought euro-area corporate bond
spreads and respective CDS premia to highly elevated levels. Unlike the corporate spreads,
their sovereign counterparts, referring to bonds issued by euro-area governments, had ﬁrst
remained fairly tight. However, in the ﬁrst quarter of 2008, they increased markedly and
did not revert to their pre-crisis levels thereafter, see Figure 1.
[Figure 1 about here]
Moreover, since that time corporate and sovereign bond spreads showed a distinct
comovement, both within and between the respective families of CDS names. Such co-
movement is meaningful since with the threat of intensifying macroeconomic repercussions
both the corporate sector (decreasing proﬁt expectation, rising risk of default) and the
public sector (decreasing tax revenues, higher ﬁscal deﬁcits and, ultimately, the threat of
sovereign default) became increasingly distressed. An additional driving force aﬀecting
bond spreads from both groups of issuers is given by investors’ risk aversion. In fact, in-
vestors’ risk aversion and hence required risk compensation is likely to be countercyclical,
hence increasing both corporate and sovereign bond spreads and CDS premia when the
state of the macroeconomy is deteriorating.
We quantify the degree of comovement by measuring the proportion of variation in
corporate and sovereign CDS premia that can be explained by a common factor. This
factor is intended to capture the above-mentioned driving forces and will be referred to in
the following as ‘the common risk factor’. Our data set covers weekly averages of daily data
on ﬁve-year senior CDS premia for corporate issuers and the government of ten euro area
countries, namely Austria (AT), Belgium (BE), Germany (DE), Spain (ES), France (FR),
Greece (GR), Ireland (IE), Italy (IT), the Netherlands (NL) and Portugal (PT). Using
CDS premia instead of bond spreads comes with the advantages that we can focus on risk
considerations (abstracting broadly from additional liquidity eﬀects as discussed above)
and also include Germany (which would otherwise serve as the reference with respect to
which bond spreads were computed). The whole sample covers the period January 2008
to June 2009, i.e. 78 weeks overall. The 2007 part of the turmoil is not included as no
signiﬁcant reactions of sovereign bond risk premia were observable during this period. The
size of the cross-section diﬀers across countries: we considered all ﬁrms, for which CDS
premia were available in Datastream and have traded suﬃciently liquidly, which amounts
to 141 ﬁrms in total for the ten countries. Viewed over all countries and issuers (both
corporates and sovereigns), there are thus 151 CDS premia in the cross-section for each
week.10
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As a measure of the common risk factor (F), we use the iTraxx index of non-ﬁnancial
CDS premia. As alternatives, we considered drawing the ﬁrst principal component from
the set of CDS premia of non-ﬁnancial corporations, or simply the median of non-ﬁnancial
CDS premia. As Figure 2 shows, all three ways of constructing the common factor lead
to very similar time series. They all clearly show the major episodes of the crisis: for
instance, the upsurge in corporate spreads in 2008Q1, or the intensiﬁcation of the crisis in
2008Q4 after the collapse of Lehman Brothers. All results in the paper are robust against
using one of the two alternative measures as the common factor instead of the iTraxx
index.
[Figure 2 about here]
Table 1 (upper panel) summarises the R2s obtained by regressing each CDS premium
in our sample on the common factor over the period January 2008 to mid-October 2008, i.e.
41 weeks preceding the announcement of the rescue packages in October 2008. For non-
ﬁnancial corporations, the common factor explains the bulk of variation for the majority
of ﬁrms with the median R2 reaching from 55% to 91%. For most of the countries, the
proportion of bank CDS premia variation explained by the common factor ranges around
80%.4 For sovereign issuers it ranges between 30% to 78%. As Table 1 (lower panel)
shows, a considerable degree of comovement is also observed when the same analysis is
conducted using weekly changes rather than levels.
[Table 1 about here]
Summing up, this initial analysis shows that during January 2008 to mid-October 2008
CDS premia displayed a common trend, probably reﬂecting a deteriorating macroeconomic
outlook and increasing investor risk aversion. This common factor not only explained the
bulk of variation in bank and sovereign CDS premia, which are the focus of analysis, but
also that of non-ﬁnancial CDS premia, lending support to our macroeconomic interpreta-
tion of the common factor.
4The number of banks in the respective countries, for which suﬃciently actively traded CDS premia
were available: AT (0), BE (1), DE (5), ES (2), FR (4), GR(0), IE (3), IT (4), NL (3), PT (2). We
did not include CDS for the Belgian-Dutch group Fortis, as in October 2008 the Dutch banking activities
were taken into the ownership of the Dutch state, and the remaining banking activities were eventually
transferred to a large extent to BNP Paribas in May 2009. For Belgium, the only bank in the sample
is Dexia, which was under particular stress before October 2008 (on 30 September 2008 Dexia received
large-scale support from the Belgian, French and Luxembourg governments), hence the relatively low R
2.
Irish banks were strongly aﬀected by national factors.11
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3 The eﬀect of government rescue packages on sovereign
and bank CDS premia
3.1 Evidence from regressions with structural breaks
The relation between the common factor and sovereign CDS premia is depicted in the
scatter plots in Figure 3. The blue circles represent the observation pairs (level of common
factor, level of sovereign CDS premium) for the period January to mid-October 2008.
Reﬂecting the relatively high R2 levels, the individual observations are clustering close to
the respective regression line.5
[Figure 3 about here]
Between end-September and mid-October, various euro area governments announced
that they would engage in large-scale ﬁnancial rescue packages. The support for banks
came in the form of government guarantees for lending in the interbank market or for
newly issued bank debt; of direct recapitalisation of ﬁnancial institutions; of enhanced
retail deposit insurance; and – especially later on – of asset relief schemes.6 Besides
implying some immediate government outlays, these measures most notably brought about
the risk of deﬁcit increases in the future. For instance, government guarantees constitute
contingent liabilities and their expected impact on future deﬁcits depends both on their
overall size and the fraction of these guarantees that is expected to be eventually called.
Overall, ﬁnancial market participants perceived the packages as a ‘risk transfer’ from the
ﬁnancial sector to governments, which was reﬂected in the CDS of the former going up
and the latter going down, see Figure 4.7
[Figure 4 about here]
Besides this level eﬀect of increasing sovereign CDS premia immediately after the
introduction of rescue packages, these measures also brought about a slope eﬀect, i.e. a
change in sensitivity to potential future aggravations of the crisis. As clearly visible in
Figure 3, the relation between the common risk factor and CDS premia remained tight,
but has steepened for all euro area sovereign issuers (red asterisks for the time mid-October
5In the charts, some regression lines look fairly horizontal, especially for countries with low CDS levels
during this period (AT, DE, FR, IE, NL). However, the respective estimate of the slope parameter has
been found to be positive and signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero (at the 5% level) for all countries considered,
and for both regressions in levels and regressions in ﬁrst diﬀerences.
6See European Central Bank (2009b). For a detailed overview of these measures in the individual
countries, see Petrovic and Tutsch (2009).
7For a more detailed discussion of this episode, see European Central Bank (2009a).12
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2008 to mid-January 2009).8 A similar picture emerges for the analysis in ﬁrst diﬀerences.9
In order to quantify this slope eﬀect, we again regressed sovereign CDS premia on the
common risk factor, now including data until mid-January 2009 and allowing for a break
at mid-October 2008, i.e. the time around which most euro area countries announced their
ﬁnancial sector support measures.10 We likewise ran this regression for the CDS premia
of banks, which will be discussed below. Hence, the set of regression equations estimated
reads:11
CDS(i,c,t)=α0(i,c)+α1(i,c) · I(t>t ∗)+[ β0(i,c)+β1(i,c) · I(t>t ∗)] · F(t)+u(i,c,t)
(3.1)
where:
CDS(i,c,t): average CDS premium of sovereign issuer (i =0 )
or of bank i, i =1 ,...,N c, in country c in week t
t∗: week ending on 10 October 2008
I(t>t ∗): dummy variable, equal to 1, if t>t ∗, 0 before that time
α0, α1, β0, β1: scalar parameters
F(t): common factor
u(i,c,t): residual
8The end of the second sub-sample (16 January 2009) corresponds to the week, when the Irish bank
Anglo Irish has been nationalised. This date has been identiﬁed by Mody (2009) as marking a break for
the analysis of sovereign CDS. In fact, after this event sovereign CDS jumped to the highest levels observed
over the turmoil and stayed at those exceptional magnitudes for two months. Hence, when continuing our
analysis with the focus on the slope beyond that date, we would at least have to allow for another break in
the intercept after mid-January. However, for tracing the crisis sensitivity beyond mid-January, we refer
to the analysis in the next sub-section, where we trace our slope parameter of interest in a continuous
fashion, using regressions with smoothly time-varying parameters.
9Charts for ﬁrst diﬀerences can be made available on request.
10The bulk of rescue messages was announced in the ﬁrst half of October, whereas the Irish Government
(which was the ﬁrst to approve bank guarantees to safeguard all deposits and liabilities of the major Irish-
owned ﬁnancial institutions) announced its measures on 30 September. We let the ﬁrst part of our sample
end with the week ending on 10 October 2008. Choosing this as the break date for all countries considered
is a sensible choice, as the Heads of State or Government of the euro area agreed on an action plan for
bank support on their meeting on 12 October 2008. We abstain from taking into account country-speciﬁc
events beyond that time (such as the introduction of asset protection schemes) as additional break dates.
However, should these have sizeable eﬀects, they would be picked up by the analysis based on smoothly
time-varying parameters below.
11The set of equations (3.1) constitutes a SUR (seemingly unrelated regressions) structure, but with the
same regressors for each equation. Hence, single-equation OLS is the eﬃcient estimator, and is equal to
GLS.13
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Analogous regressions were run for weekly changes12
ΔCDS(i,c,t)=δ0(i,c)+[ γ0(i,c)+γ1(i,c) · I(t>t ∗ + 1)] · ΔF(t)+˜ u(i,c,t),
t =1 ,...,t ∗,t ∗ +2 ,...,T (3.2)
Table 2 quantiﬁes the slope eﬀect for sovereign issuers. For the regressions in levels,
the crisis sensitivity increased at least by half (ES, PT) and for some countries (NL, IE,
AT) it increased by a factor of ﬁve or more. The corresponding t-statistics on the add-on
to the slope after the introduction of rescue packages – parameter β1 in (3.1) – reﬂect a
statistically signiﬁcant increase for all sovereign issuers except Portugal (at the 5% level).
Conducting the same analysis controlling for the lagged sovereign CDS level (not shown in
Table 2) corroborates the results.13 Finally, the results for the analogous analysis applied
to weekly changes also give a very similar message (see the last four columns).
[Table 2 about here]
Before turning to the analogous results for bank CDS premia, it may be worthwhile
to discuss the interpretation of the common risk factor in some more detail. The question
we ask is whether and by how much the sensitivity of sovereign and bank CDS premia to
aggravations of the crisis has changed after the introduction of ﬁnancial rescue packages.
One may wonder if the results are to some extent driven by the fact that the speed, at
which the crisis was unfolding, has itself picked up considerably after September. However,
what we are exploring here is the increase of our sovereign and bank CDSs relative to that
factor. In other words, our measure of the common risk factor Ft, taken as the iTraxx non-
ﬁnancial index should rather be interpreted to act as a ‘numeraire’ relative to which the risk
sensitivities of the two types of CDS premia (sovereign issuers and ﬁnancial corporations)
are measured.
Having shown that the introduction of rescue packages led to an increased risk sensi-
tivity of sovereign issuers, the relevant question is whether these ‘costs’ have bought about
not only a one-time level drop but also a decrease of risk sensitivity for banks. Figure
5 provides the counterparts to the results for the sovereign issuers reported in Figure 3
above. In fact, for all 24 banks in our sample, the relation with the common risk factor
between mid-October 2008 and mid-January 2009 (red stars) is less steep than before this
time (blue circles).
[Figure 5 about here]
12We consider (3.2) as a separate speciﬁcation for ﬁrst diﬀerences, ignoring, e.g., that (3.1) would imply
a non-invertible MA(1) error term and no intercept. But we carry over the implication of (3.1) that
observation t
∗ + 1 (the ‘jump’) is eﬀectively dummied out.
13The change in slope is clearly positive for all countries. The t-statistic for Portugal increases to 1.7,
but that for Ireland drops to 1.0.14
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These slope e®ects for banks are quanti¯ed in Table 3. The sensitivity to the common
risk factor is considerably lower during the weeks following the introduction of the rescue
packages. For the analysis in levels, the slope parameter has decreased for all banks in
the sample, the decrease being signi¯cant for 17 of the 24 banks. Finally, the results for
weekly changes of CDS premia convey a similar result.
[Table 3 about here]
3.2 Evidence from regressions with time-varying parameters
Have the apparent transfers of `risk sensitivity' been working only temporary or have they
been longer-lasting? In order to trace the evolution of crisis sensitivity further beyond mid-
January 2009, we again regressed CDS premia on the common risk factor, but now allowing
the parameters to continuously change over time rather than pre-imposing particular break
dates. This will also act as a complement to our descriptive regression analysis with breaks
shown above. Again, we may run the regression in levels or in ¯rst di®erences. However,
the level analysis would come with the problem that { also owing to the relatively short
sample { some residual variation would be falsely absorbed by the time-varying intercept.14
Hence, we run the regression on weekly di®erences only:
¢CDS(i;c;t) = °t(i;c) ¢ ¢F(t) + v(i;c;t); v(i;c;t) » N(0;r(i;c)): (3.3)
The symbols denote the same entities as in (3.2) above. We assume random walks for the
evolutions of the slope parameters
°t(i;c) = °t¡1(i;c) + w(i;c;t); w(i;c;t) » N(0;s(i;c)): (3.4)
This is a common assumptions in regression models with time-varying parameters.15 Es-
sentially, it represents an `unconditional' view on the evolution of parameters, so that {
via ¯ltering { the parameter path conditional on the observed data (here the sequence
of ¢CDS(i;c;t)) can be backed out. The size of r(i;c) governs the amount of variation
in the idiosyncratic component of the respective CDS premium. The magnitude of the
innovation variance s(i;c) governs the amount of variation in parameters.
For each pair of equations (3.3)-(3.4), identi¯ed by (i;c), we use the corresponding state
space model to construct the likelihood L(r(i;c);s(i;c);f¢CDS(i;c;t);¢F(t)gt=1;:::;T),
which is maximised to obtain estimates of r(i;c) and s(i;c).16 Given these estimates, we
14This problem could be addressed by restricting the degree of variation of the time-varying intercept
a priori or to set the degree of time variation equal to that of the slope parameter. Doing so generates
results for the slope parameters (which we are interested in) that are very similar to those for the analysis
in ¯rst di®erences.
15See, for example, the CAPM example in Zivot and Wang (2003) and the references given therein.
16In case the normality assumptions in (3.3)-(3.4) are not valid, the parameter estimates amount to
so-called quasi maximum likelihood (QML) estimates.15
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where ^ °tjt = E (°t jf¢CDS(i;c;¿);¢F(¿)g¿=1;:::;t).17
Figure 6 shows the median risk sensitivity of sovereign issuers and banks over time.18
Sovereign CDS's risk exposure was fairly constant until September 2008. During early
October, however, when governmental rescue packages were announced, their crisis sensi-
tivity nearly quintupled and stayed around this level until mid-March 2009. This pattern
corroborates our analysis using breakpoint regressions discussed above. Note that the
nationalisation of Anglo Irish in mid-January, viewed as a relevant break point in Mody
(2009), only gave rise to a minor increase in our estimated median crisis sensitivity. For
mid-March to May 2009, the estimation identi¯es a period of further increases in risk sen-
sitivity. This short episode of elevated `steepness' underlines the symmetry of the concept
of crisis sensitivity: essentially, it picks up the fact that during a period of improved mar-
ket sentiment and overall declining risk aversion, sovereign CDS premia showed a faster
decrease than their corporate counterparts. Finally, in June, the median estimated slope
parameter falls back to a level somewhat higher than prevailing by end-2008. Summing
up, after the announcement of rescue packages, the sensitivity of sovereign CDS premia to
changes in the common risk factor has stayed around higher levels than up to September
2008.
[Figure 6 about here]
Heuristically, the fact that the sovereigns' risk sensitivity has increased after the in-
troduction of rescue packages can be interpreted against the background of a standard
Merton-type bond pricing model, originally developed for pricing corporate debt and eq-
uity.19 In this model, corporate bond spreads (closely related to CDS spreads) depend
positively on the ¯rm value's volatility and leverage, i.e the debt-to-¯rm-value ratio. More-
over, the sensitivity of the bond spread with respect to volatility is in turn an increasing
function of leverage.20 Our observed pattern for sovereign debt squares well with this
theoretical result: as the governments' (contingent) liabilities increased, the sensitivity of
their bond risk premia vis-¶ a-vis the common risk factor (broadly parallel to the volatility
in the Merton model) was likewise increasing. However, while appealing as a theoretical
analogue, the applicability of considerations of corporate bond pricing to sovereign debt
is of course somewhat limited.
17The initial state for the ¯lter, i.e. ^ °0j0, is set to the OLS estimate using the ¯rst 30 observations.











19We are grateful to a member of the Editorial Board for pointing out this perspective.
20It is straightforward, to derive an analytical expression for the derivative of the bond yield with respect
to volatility, using e.g. the relations expounded in chapter 2.2 in Lando (2004). For plausible parameter
ranges, this derivative is in turn an increasing function of the debt-to-asset ratio.16
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Figure 7 displays the evolution of estimated sensitivities for the individual countries.
For most of them, the time pattern shows the same dynamics as the median. Moreover,
there is no systematic relation between the estimated sensitivities to the absolute magni-
tudes of the CDS premia (see Figure 1 again).21 This conﬁrms that the results from the
regressions with time-varying parameters are not an artefact in the sense of just reﬂect-
ing level changes in disguise. Regarding individual country patterns, the most striking
feature is the surge of the estimated Austrian crisis sensitivity during the week ending
20 February 2009. During this week, market commentators were pointing to a rebound
of investors’ risk aversion, triggered in part by a report by Moody’s, which stressed the
exposure of Western European banks to Eastern Europe. This induced sovereign but also
corporate CDS premia in the euro area to rise markedly. Compared to the recent past,
the increase in sovereign CDS has been disproportionately strong, hence the (moderate)
increase in the median estimated sensitivity parameter, see Figure 6 again. For Austria,
however, the signiﬁcant exposure of its banking system vis-` a-vis Eastern Europe – and
in turn the increased expected ﬁscal burden for the governments to support the ﬁnancial
system – led to a surge of government bonds’ CDS premia. From the viewpoint of the
time-varying regression model, this did not only trigger a strong increase in sensitivity for
that particular week, but the Austrian risk exposure stayed high until end-April.22
[Figure 7 about here]
The behaviour of the sensitivity of bank CDS premia in Figure 6 roughly provides
the mirror image of the sovereign pattern. Again the crisis sensitivity remained roughly
constant, around 1.0, until mid-September. Unlike for the sovereigns, it then showed a
short-lived increase associated with the collapse of Lehman Brothers. With the introduc-
tion of the rescue packages, the crisis sensitivity decreased and ranged between 0.7 and 0.8
from November 2008 to March 2009 before increasing somewhat in the second quarter of
2009 to a magnitude of around 0.9. Thus, according to the median outcome, banks’ risk
exposure after the introduction of governmental support packages has overall remained
below its pre-October-2008 level.
This result holds also for most individual banks in our sample (not shown). For all
24 banks, the crisis sensitivity dropped in the ﬁrst half of October. For 20 of them, the
21In particular, there is no clear positive correlation between estimated parameters and CDS levels,
neither before nor after the introduction of rescue packages. Leaving out the ‘transition period’ of the ﬁrst
two weeks of October, one obtains correlations between parameters and CDS levels that range from -0.6
(FR) to 0.5 (NL) for the sub-sample January 2008 to end-September 2008; correlations for the time after
mid-October 2008 are likewise in this range, but the extremes correspond to diﬀerent countries (PT: -0.4;
AT: 0.5).
22Note that we have not included any Austrian bank in our group of banks, as there were too many stale
quotes in the respective series of CDS premia.17
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crisis sensitivity at the end of the sample (end-June 2009) was estimated to range below
the corresponding pre-October magnitude. Hence, from this perspective, the transfer of
risk sensitivity has been enduring.
4 Conclusion
Since the beginning of 2008, sovereign and corporate CDS premia showed a broad co-
movement. The bulk of variation in these credit risk measures between January and
mid-October 2008 can be explained by one common risk factor, the iTraxx index of nonﬁ-
nancial corporations’ CDS premia. With the introduction of governments’ rescue packages
for the ﬁnancial system around early October 2008, the levels of bank CDS premia de-
creased shortly, while those of sovereign issuers surged. This was widely considered as
reﬂecting a ‘risk transfer’ from the private ﬁnancial to the public sector.
The empirical analysis in this paper has shown that in addition to this one-oﬀ level
eﬀect, the perceived risk transfer from the banking sector to governments also had a dy-
namic dimension in the following sense. After the introduction of ﬁnancial rescue packages,
i) the sensitivity of bank CDS premia to further aggravations of the crisis was lower than
before, ii) while the sensitivity of sovereign CDS premia to movements in the common risk
factor became higher.
In this sense, the rescue packages have been eﬀective in slowing down the increase of
bond risk premia for ﬁnancial institutions, but this beneﬁt came at the considerable cost
of increasing the sensitivity of sovereign bond risk premia to further aggravations of the
ﬁnancial crisis. However, there is no obvious way how these two opposing eﬀects can be
weighted against each other, rendering an overall ‘welfare’ evaluation infeasible.
Like all regression analyses with breaks or time-varying parameters, it cannot be ex-
cluded that movements in parameters (here the changing sensitivity to the common risk
factor) is masking the omittance of additional explanatory variables. In principle, this
view can be brought in line with our analysis in a relatively straightforward fashion. The
regression with breaks and the regression with smoothly time-varying parameters both
suggest that parameters changed more-or-less in a step-wise fashion. Hence, alternatively,
a regression with our common risk factor and another regressor that is a product of this
factor and a ‘step-shaped’ variable would bring about a constant-parameter speciﬁcation.
However, in absence of a readily available observable and interpretable variable of this
type23, the approach chosen here arguably oﬀers a more direct and economically intuitive
interpretation.
The analysis in this paper has been largely descriptive, focusing on one important
23Conceptually, ﬁscal variables relating to expected deﬁcits would be natural candidates. However, while
they may help explaining cross-sectional patterns, they are not available at a high-frequency basis, and
thus cannot be used directly within our regressions with weekly data.18
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aspect of the ﬁnancial crisis, namely the changing sensitivity of sovereign and bank CDS
premia to overall aggravations of the crisis. To be aware of and being able to quantify
such time-varying risk sensitivity can be relevant as a tool for macro-prudential analysis,
and can help to detect when a particular ﬁnancial institution’s risk sensitivity is beginning
‘to take oﬀ’. Moreover, it may be helpful in portfolio analysis or risk management, e.g.
when hedging a portfolio containing bank and/or sovereign credit risk exposure.19
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Table 1: Proportion of variance of CDS premia (R2) explained by common
factor
Results are based on regressing individual CDS premia on the iTraxx index of non-ﬁnancial
CDS premia, using average weekly data from 4 January 2008 to 10 October 2008. Upper
panel: levels; lower panel: ﬁrst diﬀerences. The number of banks in the countries: AT (0),
BE (1), DE (5), ES (2), FR (4), GR(0), IE (3), IT (4), NL (3), PT (2).
Sovereign Non-ﬁnancials Banks
Min Median Max Median
AT 0.31 0.73 0.76 0.80
BE 0.48 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.33
DE 0.35 0.14 0.66 0.94 0.73
ES 0.62 0.23 0.63 0.85 0.79
FR 0.46 0.34 0.65 0.90 0.83
GR 0.78 0.55 0.55 0.55
IE 0.30 0.46 0.59 0.72 0.39
IT 0.60 0.46 0.72 0.76 0.72
NL 0.39 0.25 0.74 0.85 0.83
PT 0.64 0.63 0.74 0.86 0.81
Sovereign Non-ﬁnancials Banks
Min Median Max Median
AT 0.18 0.53 0.67 0.80
BE 0.17 0.81 0.81 0.81 0.17
DE 0.15 0.08 0.71 0.84 0.49
ES 0.36 0.52 0.75 0.88 0.58
FR 0.26 0.18 0.67 0.89 0.48
GR 0.30 0.65 0.65 0.65
IE 0.10 0.53 0.56 0.59 0.24
IT 0.31 0.34 0.67 0.70 0.57
NL 0.13 0.21 0.70 0.89 0.62
PT 0.32 0.76 0.78 0.81 0.51
A Tables and ﬁgures21
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Table 2: Regression of sovereign CDS on common factor allowing for
structural break in mid-October 2008
Results are based on estimated regressions (3.1) for levels and (3.2) for weekly changes,
using average weekly data from 4 January 2008 to 16 January 2009. The Latin letters b
and g denote the estimates of the parameters β and γ in (3.1) and (3.2), respectively. t(.)
denotes the t-statistic based on HAC-consistent estimates of standard deviations of these
parameter estimates.
Levels Weekly changes
b0 b0 + b1 (b0 + b1)/b0 t(b1) g0 g0 + g1 (g0 + g1)/g0 t(g1)
AT 0.1 1.3 10.8 11.5 0.1 0.8 7.7 8.1
BE 0.2 0.6 3.3 8.3 0.1 0.4 3.0 3.4
DE 0.1 0.3 3.2 5.5 0.1 0.2 2.8 3.7
ES 0.3 0.5 1.6 2.1 0.2 0.5 2.1 3.5
FR 0.1 0.3 2.7 5.6 0.1 0.3 2.3 4.9
GR 0.5 2.0 4.2 7.1 0.3 0.9 3.2 3.8
IE 0.3 1.7 6.7 7.1 0.2 0.8 4.8 4.4
IT 0.4 1.3 3.6 9.3 0.3 0.9 3.3 4.2
NL 0.1 0.8 7.6 11.8 0.1 0.5 5.7 3.8
PT 0.3 0.5 1.4 1.5 0.2 0.5 2.1 3.022
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Table 3: Regression of bank CDS on common factor allowing for struc
tural break in mid-October 2008
The included banks are – in alphabetical order: ABN Amro Bank, Allied Irish Bank
Anglo Irish Bank, Banca M.d.P. di Siena, Banca Ppo. Italiana, Banco Bilbao Vizcay
Banco Comr. Portugues, Banco Espirito Santo, Banco Stdr. Ctl. Hisp., Bank of Ir
land, Bayer. Hypo, BNP Paribas, Commerzbank, Credit Agricole, Deutsche Bank, Dex
Group, Dresdner Bank, ING Bank, Intesa Sanpaolo, Natixis, Rabobank, Societe Ge
erale, Unicredito Italiano and WestLB. In the table the banks are sorted w.r.t the
relative change in slope in the level regressions. See also notes of Table 2.
Levels Weekly changes
b0 b0 + b1
b0+b1
b0 t(b1) g0 g0 + g1
g0+g1
g0 t(g1)
Bank 1 1.4 -0.0 -0.0 -9.8 1.3 0.2 0.1 -5.4
Bank 2 2.2 0.4 0.2 -2.9 1.1 0.5 0.4 -1.8
Bank 3 1.1 0.2 0.2 -10.0 1.0 0.3 0.3 -3.0
Bank 4 1.5 0.4 0.3 -5.1 1.3 0.3 0.2 -4.9
Bank 5 1.1 0.3 0.3 -9.5 1.2 0.4 0.3 -3.6
Bank 6 1.3 0.4 0.3 -6.4 1.0 0.6 0.5 -2.0
Bank 7 1.0 0.3 0.3 -6.3 1.0 0.4 0.4 -2.8
Bank 8 1.2 0.4 0.3 -5.3 1.2 0.9 0.7 -1.1
Bank 9 0.9 0.3 0.4 -5.2 0.9 0.6 0.6 -1.4
Bank 10 1.0 0.4 0.4 -5.3 1.1 0.8 0.7 -1.2
Bank 11 0.8 0.3 0.4 -7.3 0.8 0.3 0.4 -3.2
Bank 12 3.2 1.2 0.4 -1.8 1.1 0.3 0.3 -0.7
Bank 13 1.1 0.4 0.4 -4.6 1.0 0.5 0.5 -2.1
Bank 14 2.5 1.2 0.5 -1.3 1.5 0.3 0.2 -1.7
Bank 15 1.1 0.5 0.5 -6.4 1.0 0.6 0.6 -2.2
Bank 16 0.9 0.5 0.5 -3.1 1.0 0.7 0.7 -1.5
Bank 17 1.0 0.5 0.5 -4.4 1.0 0.8 0.8 -1.1
Bank 18 1.0 0.5 0.5 -2.0 0.9 0.5 0.5 -2.7
Bank 19 1.1 0.8 0.7 -1.0 1.1 0.4 0.4 -2.6
Bank 20 0.8 0.7 0.8 -1.4 1.0 0.7 0.7 -1.4
Bank 21 1.6 1.3 0.9 -0.5 1.2 0.5 0.4 -1.3
Bank 22 0.8 0.7 0.9 -0.8 0.9 0.9 0.9 -0.4
Bank 23 0.9 0.9 1.0 -0.1 0.7 0.4 0.6 -1.5
Bank 24 1.6 1.6 1.0 -0.0 1.2 0.5 0.4 -1.323
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Figure 1: Five-year euro area sovereign CDS premia
Weekly averages of ﬁve-year CDS premia in basis points. Source: Datastream.













Median of all non−financial firms in sample
PC1 extracted from non−financials
Figure 2: Different measures of ‘common risk factor’
PC1 denotes the ﬁrst principal component.24
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Figure 3: Relation between common risk factor and individual sovereign
CDS premia, levels.
Blue circles represent data pairs (CDS of country, iTraxx non-ﬁnancial index) for the
period 4 January 2008 to 10 October 2008; red asterisks for the period 17 October 2008 to
16 January 2009. Solid lines are based on regressions of individual CDS on the common
factor within the respective time period.25
ECB
Working Paper Series No 1127
December 2009








Change in sovereign CDS
IT FR ES NL PT DE IE BE
Median change in bank CDS
BE = −109 bps
Figure 4: Change of sovereign and bank CDS premia upon the introduction
of rescue packages
Bars denote the changes (in basis points) of the average CDS premia from the week ending
10 October 2008, representing the period immediately before the introduction of rescue
measures, to the week ending 17 October 2008, representing the time immediately after
these measures. For the number of banks in the respective countries, see Table 1.26
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Figure 5: Relation between common risk factor and individual bank CDS
premia, levels
Data pairs represent (iTraxx non-ﬁnancial index, CDS of bank). The ordering is the same
as in Table 3. See also the notes of Figure 3.27
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Median parameter path − sovereigns
Median parameter path − banks
Figure 6: Median of estimated risk sensitivity of sovereign issuers and banks
over time
For each week, the ﬁgure displays the median (across banks or countries, respectively) of
estimated time-varying ˆ γt|t(i,c) in equation (3.3).29
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Figure 7: Estimated risk sensitivity of individual sovereign issuers
For each week, the ¯gure displays the estimated time-varying ^ °tjt(0;c), in equation (3.3).30
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